How to spot a housing bubble: Bill Moss

Long-term strategic planning has always been one of my passions. To me, thinking ahead, being observant, asking questions and working out where the world is going, whether it be economically or socially, are basic, vital skills.

Take Dubai for instance. I first went there in the early 1990s and driving around at night, the first observation I made and the first question I asked myself was: “Why are only 20% of the lights on in all the residential buildings?” Talking to people who lived there, I soon discovered most residential properties were empty because they had been bought as second homes by wealthy people who lived in other parts of the Arab world in case of problems in their own countries, as a hedge against revolution, or as a place to keep a mistress. I left without wanting to invest in Dubai.

I have always believed that no one should ever invest in anything unless the fundamentals are right. If the people who pay the rent or borrow the money to purchase a property cannot afford to keep up repayments, then a property investment fails. After a global financial crisis, the concept of keeping vacant real estate as an inventory item, as the sheiks of Dubai did or as the Chinese and Russians tried to do, is doomed to end in tears.

In the mid-2000s, a decade after my first visit there, Dubai was obviously becoming really powerful as an international growth centre; a destination with a low tax rate that was attractive to wealthy Westerners, Russians, Indians and Middle Easterners alike. If you came from a country that was politically unstable, Dubai was potentially a future safe place to call home, and there were plenty of wealthy people from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Georgia – the list goes on and on – keen to purchase real estate there. Dubai was seen as a safe haven within the Middle East and appeared to be safe from terrorists. It had a world-class airline and had become a major global strategic and business hub. But as I watched Dubai grow and grow, I realised within a few years it was all a giant bubble that one day, sooner or later, was going to burst. And the reason it was always going to burst was because when you analysed what was going on, the situation in the early 2000s was no different from the early 1990s; the majority of residential properties were unoccupied. Whole projects were being purchased by absentee foreign owners, then locked up and left vacant. The outlandish boom in real estate prices could not possibly last as there was nowhere near enough demand either locally, or eventually internationally, to keep it going.

The model widely used in Dubai to create value was a pyramid scheme. The owners of a piece of land, who invariably had government connections, would design the largest, flashiest apartment building they could and sell a percentage of the units off the plan at a perceived below-market price to associates, who were effectively sub-underwriters. Everyone was told the second release of sales once the building was finished would be at a higher price, to create the panicky sense of “I must buy now”. The first round of purchasers would then sell out some of their stock at a higher price than they had paid, but below the next release price, and so it went on. Foreigners would end up owning some of the apartments but the rich local families held most of the stock as inventory at inflated prices. But real estate should never be held vacant as inventory, because vacant property depreciates and costs money to hold, particularly when you borrow against it to buy shares that ultimately collapse, as many of the wealthy in Dubai found out in the GFC. Ultimately the Dubai boom, like so many others, was predicated on nothing more than hot air; people just talking the market up and up and up. All the apartments and houses were getting dearer and dearer, but there were no tenants to give investors an economic return. The result was that in the last purchasing wave, just before the GFC hit, Dubai was turned into a virtual investment ghost town, the only people who could still afford to buy there being a shrinking pool of Russian and Middle Eastern billionaires.

Realising 10 years ago that Dubai would eventually collapse, I continually warned my more eager colleagues not to invest there. But a lot of people who should know better – not least because they are responsible for investing other people’s money – simply do not understand basic market fundamentals. They just read analysts’ reports or, even worse, newspapers, and believe the hype. They simply believe what they are told. When it came to investing in Dubai’s thousands of new apartments, they never checked who was living in or renting them. It is a bit of economics, but mainly it is a lot of common sense. Succeeding in business ultimately comes down to asking oneself one simple question: “Why is this so?” — because everything works on fundamentals of supply, demand and access to debt. You can distort the fundamentals for 10 or 20 years but ultimately, everything works on fundamentals.

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