Us Election

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GUEST OBSERVER
Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump recently claimed “phony polling” is suppressing his vote and predicted the outcome of the US election will be “Brexit times five”.
By “Brexit times five”, Trump is referring to the surprising referendum result in favour of Britain leaving the European Union, an outcome that went against the predictions of most polls. Given the unexpected triumph of Britain’s “Leave” campaign, is it possible that Trump could produce a surprise result of even greater proportions?
Many explanations are put forward to account for voting patterns, especially when they don’t match the polls.
Good sampling methodology – that is, how to choose a group of people likely to reflect the characteristics of the broader population – is key to ensuring accurate and useful results. An understanding of likely voter turnout is also important, especially in the US and other countries where voting is voluntary.
But other factors, such as the language and wording used, can also effect the results of any survey, including electoral polls.
One likely factor in the discrepancy between the pre-referendum Brexit polls and the final result was social desirability bias – the human tendency to portray ourselves in the most favourable light. This bias may not necessarily be conscious. It’s common in social surveys, where the need to be seen to be doing “the right thing” can overwhelm honest responses.
For example, it’s socially desirable for people to disagree with the statement “I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my own way”, even though it’s likely everybody has felt this way at some time. Self-reporting of alcohol consumption is typically 40-50% lower than actual consumption rates.
In the case of Brexit, the “Leave” campaign became associated with xenophobia and racism. Because this was regarded negatively by mainstream society, it likely resulted in people understating their support for the “Leave” campaign when asked by pollsters.
Social desirability bias is exacerbated by the presence of other people, so it’s more prominent when survey questions are asked directly by an interviewer, either in person or over the phone.
If social desirability was a factor in the inconsistency between the Brexit polls and the final result, we should see a difference between the polls taken by telephone interviews and those conducted online.
Let’s look at the polls from the final week of the Brexit campaign. Out of five telephone polls, none predicted a win for “Leave”. Out of eight online polls, four predicted a win.
This is particularly surprising because one might expect lower polling for the “Leave” vote in online polls, since this method captures younger voters who were (at least publically) more opposed to Brexit. Assuming no other methodological issues were at play, this suggests that social desirability may have been a factor.
Like the “Leave” campaign, Trump’s campaign is associated with the socially negative attributes of xenophobia and racism, as well as sexism and allegations of sexual misconduct. This is likely to cause a social desirability bias with a tendency for people to under report their support for Trump.
Now let’s look at Trump’s “Brexit times five” claim. In both telephone and online polls taken during the last week of the Brexit campaign, the average result was 46.5% for “Remain” and 44.5% for “Leave”. Excluding the undecided voters, this equates to 51% for “Remain” and 49% for “Leave”.
The result of the actual vote was 48% for “Remain” and 52% for “Leave”. On the basis of this simplistic analysis, and with this particular mix of telephone and online polls, we could argue that social desirability bias suppressed the polled support for “Leave” by around 3%.
As of November 1, the US polling aggregation website FiveThirtyEightsays the national averages for the popular vote in the US election are 49.2% for Clinton and 44.5% for Trump, a difference of 4.7% in favour of Clinton.
If Trump is able to achieve “Brexit times five” – that is, gain 15% more votes on election day than the polls would suggest – he would indeed be well-placed for victory. But unlike Brexit, this result would need to be repeated in each state and reflected in the Electoral College votes, rather than just a single national vote.
Although important and often present, the effects of social desirability bias are likely to be relatively minor in polls that are properly conducted, and only likely to cause surprise results in a tight race. The degree to which the polling averages may be misled by social desirability bias depends on the mix of methods used to collect the answers – with a greater reliance on telephone polling more likely to capture a greater degree of bias.
So while it’s possible that Trump’s polling is depressed, and while he may win more votes than expected on Election Day, he’s still unlikely to win the Presidency.
Alex Kusmanoff is PhD candidate, Inter-disciplinary Conservation Science and Research Group, RMIT University and can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/alex-kusmanoff-262169" target="_blank">here</a>.
Fiona Fidler is senior research fellow at the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University and can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/fiona-fidler-9370" target="_blank">here</a>.
Sarah Bekessy is associate professor, RMIT University and can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sarah-bekessy-94860" target="_blank">here</a>.
All are authors for The Conversation.
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jchancellor-FAypfDUnLy

What effect will closet Trump voters have on the US Election?

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GUEST OBSERVER
Opinion polls, statistical prediction models and betting markets are now all predicting a fairly comfortable victory for Hilary Clinton in the United States presidential election.
However, they all said much the same about the prospect of British voters opting to remain in the European Union, before a majority of them actually voted to leave at the Brexit referendum in June. 
In Brexit those wanting “change” felt much more strongly about it and were thus more inclined to vote, than those favouring the status quo. This might also be the case with Trump voters. So the possibility of a Trump victory can’t be entirely dismissed – and the possible economic consequences of such an outcome are worth considering.
Precisely because a triumph for Trump has by now been so widely discounted – including by the financial markets – this outcome would prompt a much larger financial market reaction than a Clinton victory. 
The unexpected outcome of the Brexit referendum saw the London share market fall by more than 5%, and the British pound by more than 8%, in the following 24 hours. And although the share market has since more than recouped its initial losses, the pound is now almost 18% below its pre-referendum level against the US dollar.
The financial market reaction to a Trump victory in the US presidential race is likely to be sharper. As the Reserve Bank of Australia governor Philip Lowe noted earlier this month, “the possible election of President Trump wouldn’t be as benign an event”, as Brexit turned out to be. A paper published this week by Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz (of the University of Michigan and Dartmouth College, respectively) suggests that the US, UK and Asian share markets could fall by 10-15 percent, and that the Mexican peso would fall by 25 percent, in the event of a Trump victory.
From an historical perspective this is an extraordinary prospect, given that, as Wolfers and Zitzewitz note:
"In almost every case back to 1880, equity markets have risen on the news that Republicans win elections and fall when Democrats win."
This is also because, at least superficially, Trump is proposing policies that are more likely to benefit rich households (who are more likely to own equities), while Clinton is explicitly advocating higher taxes on capital.
These findings are more understandable in the light of mainstream economists’ assessments of the likely implications of the policy proposals put forward by the two main contenders. Out of 414 respondents to a survey conducted by the US National Association of Business Economists, 55% thought Hilary Clinton would “do the best job as president of managing the economy”. 
Only 14 percent thought that Donald Trump would (and that was 1 percentage point less than the proportion who nominated Libertarian Party candidate Gary Johnson). It’s perhaps worth emphasising that this was a survey of business, not academic, economists.
This overwhelming view likely reflects three particularly important concerns to mainstream economists about the Republican presidential candidate’s policies.
<h2>Differences in policies</h2>
Donald Trump’s policies would significantly increase the US Budget deficit. The bipartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) last month estimated that the combination of tax cuts and spending increases proposed by Donald Trump would add US$5.3 trillion to US public debt over the next decade, lifting it from 77 percent to 105 percent of GDP. 
By contrast, the spending and tax measures (cuts for some, increases for others) advocated by Hilary Clinton would boost public debt by US$200 billion, to 86% of GDP, over the next decade. A more recent analysis of Donald Trump’s tax proposals by the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution’s Tax Policy Center suggests that they would increase US Federal debt by US$7.2 trillion over a decade. 
While both candidates assert that their policy proposals would boost economic growth, which would in turn result in lower (rather than higher) budget deficits, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB)  calculates that economic growth would need to average 3.5% per annum over the next decade in order to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio without further tax increases. According to the CRFB, that would “likely require a level of productivity growth that has not been achieved in any decade in modern history”. Whereas the same objective would require economic growth averaging 2.7% per annum under Hillary Clinton’s proposals.
In addition to this, Donald Trump has consistently advocated a major upheaval in US trade policies, including the repudiation of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the designation of China as a “currency manipulator”. This is something which under existing US trade laws would allow the imposition of tariffs of up to 45% on goods imported into the US from China. 
The greatest adverse impact of such measures would be on low-income households in the US, as the result of having to pay much higher prices for goods that make up a large proportion of their spending. But there would also be an obvious negative impact on the Chinese economy – since China’s exports to the US account for 18% of its total exports, and just under 4% of China’s GDP. 
It’s also hard to imagine that China wouldn’t seek to retaliate in some way against any such measures by a Trump Administration. In a studypublished by the Petersen Institute, Marcus Nolan, Sherman Robinson and Tyler Moran suggest that in such circumstances, the US economy would experience a recession in 2018 and 2019, with unemployment rising to 8.6%.
It’s hard to imagine how a trade war between the world’s two largest economies, Australia’s largest and third-largest trading partners, could have anything other than negative consequences for Australia.
Another concern for mainstream economists arising from Donald Trump’s economic agenda is his contempt for the independence of the US Federal Reserve. Trump’s suggestion that the Federal Reserve should have been more willing to raise US interest rates this year is not without some basis. 
But his personal criticisms of Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen, combined with the fact that there are already two unfilled vacancies on the Fed’s Board of Governors, suggests that the Fed could quickly become much more politicised in the event of a Trump victory. That would likely undermine confidence in US monetary policy, potentially leading in turn to a weaker US dollar and higher US bond yields. 
<h2>Relationships between the US and other nations</h2>
Beyond these concerns to mainstream economists, the Republican candidate’s attitude to longstanding US strategic alliances – with European countries, Japan and Korea – threatens to create much greater political uncertainty around the world. It may even prompt an “arms race” entailing greater proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Trump hasn’t specifically listed Australia as being among the US allies who “aren’t paying anywhere near what it costs to defend them”. It could be that Australia’s status, as one of the few countries with which the US runs a trade surplus, puts us in a different category. Nonetheless, a deteriorating regional security environment could result in the Australian government concluding that it needs to spend more on defence.
It’s important to note that not all of the foregoing concerns will be completely alleviated should, as seems more likely, Hillary Clinton becoms the 45th President of the United States. If that result were to be accompanied by a “clean sweep” of both the Senate and (less likely) the House of Representatives, left-wing Democrats such as Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders will have a much larger influence on US economic policy. 
The differences between Donald Trump and the left wing of the Democratic Party on trade policy, or on the independence of the Federal Reserve, are in reality quite small. So while a Clinton victory on 8th November is much the better outcome from an Australian perspective, it would not be in Australia’s interests for her to win too well.
Saul Eslake is vice-chancellor’s fellow, University of Tasmania and author for The Conversation. He can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/saul-eslake-665" target="_blank">here</a>.
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A Trump presidency could bring a range of economic disasters

The potential implications of the US Presidential election on Australia: NAB's Alan Oster

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GUEST OBSERVER
Everyone knows by now that the current, endlessly drawn-out electoral process in the US is remarkable, even by the standards of an increasingly weird political era.
The consensus is that no matter who becomes the next president, it will be bad. If it’s Donald Trump, though, it could be apocalyptic.
Despite growing concerns about declining American power and influence, the US still dominates the region upon which Australia has increasingly come to depend. Therefore, the election outcome will have potentially major and enduring consequences for Australia and the wider Asia-Pacific region.
<h2>What do Trump’s foreign policies suggest?</h2>
Even though many people have real and understandable doubts about Hillary Clinton’s historical baggage, inconsistency and proclivity for “misspeaking”, most serious analysts hope she wins. The alternative is too awful, unpredictable and frankly alarming to even contemplate. 
Consequently, not many people – including Australia’s foreign policy establishment, it seems – have given much thought to what happens if Trump triumphs.
Consistency and measured reflection are not words often seen in the same sentence as Donald Trump, but it is possible to get some idea of what his foreign policy might look like. Most of it is alarming. And none of it is likely to be good for Australia.
Trump’s policies are frequently described as “neo-isolationist”. They resonate with many who are disillusioned with the supposed failings of the Obama doctrine, and sick of American involvement in seemingly intractable conflicts in places they neither know nor care about.
Many Americans are remarkably ill-informed and uninterested in foreign policy. This is not a unique national characteristic, but some of the widely shared beliefs that inform voting intentions in what is still the world’s most-powerful country are striking.
For example, the average American thinks something like one-quarter of its US$4 trillion national budget is spent on foreign aid. In reality it’s less than a miserly 1%. 
Trump may share this misapprehension for all we know. Either way, he is threatening to make supposedly freeloading allies pick up more of the bill for America’s implicit defence guarantees.
<h2>What might it all mean for Australia?</h2>
Given Australians have made disproportionate sacrifices to underpin its alliance relationship with the US over the years, this is a bit rich.
Australia’s major parties seem to have a policy of not having a policy when it comes to dealing with a possible Trump presidency. The reality would – or should – force a rethink of some of the most enduring foundations of Australian foreign policy.
This is why so many of Australia’s foreign policy and strategic elites are pinning their hopes on Clinton. She wouldn’t welcome the label, but Clinton is clearly the establishment candidate and consummate insider who can be relied upon to do the right thing as far as Australia and the world is concerned.
One assumes this may include rediscovering her surprisingly lost enthusiasm for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Her habit of being economical with the truth is one of the reasons she is personally unpopular, such an electoral liability, and no certainty to knock off the most unlikely and unpredictable candidate in recent US political history.
As far as our region is concerned, most analysts will be reassured by the prospect of a Clinton presidency. She is one of the architects of the so-called “pivot”, or shift in American strategic priorities to the Asia-Pacific region and response to China’s seemingly inexorable rise. 
Whether she has the will to confront an expansionist China is the big question. Whether smaller countries like Australia would want her to is another question altogether. But this is not an issue that often gets an unambiguous airing here, despite the amount we are currently investing in military modernisation.
The prospects for Australia could be daunting no matter who wins the election. It is conceivable that Trump may follow through on his threat to demand greater self-reliance on the part of traditional allies and simply pull American forces out of the region. This would allow China to assert its dominance, and fundamentally overturn the long-standing basis of Australian foreign policy.
If Clinton wins, though, the options don’t necessarily look any more auspicious, even if they are more predictable. If the US is ever to stand up to China and try to reassert its former dominance of our region, it will have to get on with it.
If we extrapolate from here, it is only a question of time before China overtakes the US on every significant measure of great power status.
Clinton may decide it is her historical destiny to reassert American primacy, not to mention defend the rules-based international order that the US has done so much to develop – if not necessarily abide by – over the last half-century. 
Under such circumstances, Australia’s nightmare choice between its principal security guarantor and its most important trade partner may come one step closer. And that’s the good outcome.
Mark Beeson is professor of International Politics, University of Western Australia and author for The Conversation. He can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/mark-beeson-60300" target="_blank">here</a>.
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Trump or Clinton: who will be the best for our region

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GUEST OBSERVER
Uncertainty about future policy decisions is often identified as major drag on a country’s economy.
Uncertainty about interest rate movements, for example, may see households postpone their consumption, and entrepreneurs wait and see before investing in a business. As a result, aggregate demand naturally weakens, and the economy slows down. 
But how relevant is uncertainty, really? 
Economists need measures of uncertainty to quantify its impact on the business cycle of a country. A trio of US based economists - Scott Baker (Northwestern University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), and Steven Davis (University of Chicago) recently developed an index of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) for a variety of countries, including Australia. 
To create the index, they select country-specific newspapers and perform a search for keywords that are associated with the economy, policy decisions, and uncertainty surrounding such decisions. To the extent that newspapers offer information on perceptions of uncertainty by households and entrepreneurs in that country, this index can be fruitfully used to assess the macroeconomic consequences of spikes in uncertainty. 
The graph below depicts the evolution of the Australian EPU since 1997. 
<a href="/images/2016/11/03/image-20161031-15821-1rstzhw.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/11/03/image-20161031-15821-1rstzhw.png" alt="">
Monthly data from Australian newspapers (Times and Financial Times). Data to July 2016. www.policyuncertainty.com, Author provided
Spikes in this index are mostly associated to external events such as 9/11, the second Gulf War, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers due to the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, the US debt ceiling dispute, and more recently, Brexit. 
Domestic political events also increase the value of the index. Some of the jumps in this EPU index are significant, the largest one corresponding to the Brexit referendum in June 2016. The researchers interpret these spikes as jumps in uncertainty over the policy response of the Reserve Bank of Australia and/or the Treasury to these external and internal events. 
<h2>But Australia’s economy remains strong…</h2>
In spite of these fluctuations in uncertainty, however, not much has been going on in the Australian business cycle. 
The last official recession in Australia occurred in the early 1990s. Recent figures point to a yearly growth rate of Australia’s real GDP of 3.3%, much larger than that of most industrialised countries in the world. 
And Australia’s future is reasonably bright. According to the Reserve Bank of Australia governor Philip Lowe:
"Domestic demand is expected to strengthen gradually as the drag on our economy from the decline in mining investment comes to an end. […] Some pick-up in wages and prices could then be expected. In addition, commodity prices, after having declined over the preceding four years, have increased this year. If sustained, this will boost national income and falls in petrol prices will no longer be having a significant effect on headline inflation."
Recent research conducted by RBA economists makes use of econometric models suited to isolate the role of uncertainty and its impact on Australia’s real activity.
Such research finds uncertainty exerts a negative but fairly small effect on domestic investment and employment growth. 
So, why hasn’t uncertainty affected Australia’s economy much? 
In work conducted with a pool of researchers based at the Melbourne Institute, I found that jumps in uncertainty are particularly harmful for a country’s growth if they hit a country already experiencing a downturn. 
The “uncertainty-recession” multiplier – the negative effects on the overall production of a country due to jumps in uncertainty occurring during a recession – is found to be much larger than the “uncertainty-expansion” multiplier (the negative effects when a country is in a boom). 
Intuitively, a reduction in confidence (which is akin to an increase in uncertainty) is likely to more severely affect households and entrepreneurs when a slowdown in economic activity is already underway. 
Committing to purchase a car or invest in a new machine can be very costly if economic conditions worsen in future. Reselling a car to pay for rent, clothing or food would likely turn out to be a capital loss, more than a capital gain. And why should entrepreneurs buy a new machine during a recession characterised by high uncertainty? Better to wait until the smoke clears. 
On the other hand, during an economic boom any effects of jumps in uncertainty are likely to be (at least) partly offset by expectations of high returns from investment. This means there may not necessarily be a reduction in how optimistic households are, or their consumption.
Monetary policy may also help explain why jumps in uncertainty may be more relevant in other countries than in Australia. Reductions in short-term interest rates can alleviate the negative effects of jumps in uncertainty for the economy by reducing the cost of borrowing. This supports investment by firms and household consumption, helping the country maintain a solid real GDP growth rate. 
However, decisions over consumption and investment are likely to become less dependent on interest rates when economic conditions are severe and people in the economic system prefer to save for precautionary reasons. 
And countries facing near zero or negative interest rates are likely to experience more severe effects of an uncertainty shock due to the inability of the central bank to lower borrowing costs enough to sustain the economy.
Australia’s growth has been reasonably solid even during the global financial crisis. And it is certainly true that the RBA has gradually decreased the cash rate over the years to offer support to the Australian economy. However, with a cash rate currently set at 1.5%, the RBA still has room for a reduction of borrowing costs if required. 
In the absence of a recession or near zero interest rates, it is then not a surprise that uncertainty shocks have not caused major problems for the Australian economy for the last two decades. 
All good, then? Well, as long as growth stays solid, yes. The best way policymakers can tame uncertainty and its effects is to keep designing policies aimed at maintaining our growth at a reasonable level.
Efrem Castelnuovo is principal research fellow, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research - associate professor, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Melbourne and author for The Conversation. He can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/efrem-castelnuovo-145615" target="_blank">here</a>.
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Why Brexit and the spectre of President Trump aren’t hurting Australia’s economy

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GUEST OBSERVER
The 2016 US presidential election has been unprecedented in several ways. For starters, seasoned psephologists were surprised by Donald Trump’s success in the Republican primaries. 
And while the “fundamentals” of the election would suggest the Republicans would have a significant edge – due to tepid economic growth and an incumbent Democratic president – even one of the key proponents of this model doubts its applicability this year. 
The reason for this doubt is that Trump is an unconventional candidate who has eschewed normal campaign practices such as setting up field offices, building up campaign staff, fundraising, and spending on TV advertisements. 
Trump’s campaign has been built upon controversial statements that have kept his name in the news. This strategy served him well during the primaries, where he received nearly US$3 billion in free coverage. 
Any one of Trump’s major gaffes would have likely been fatal for other campaigns. But he has proven uniquely resilient. Why?
<h2>Trump and populism</h2>
The narrative the Trump campaign has played during the continual turmoil and controversy that has surrounded him is that the elites who have abandoned him or disagree with him are all part of the establishment he seeks to destroy. This is a populist appeal that resonates with a large portion of the population who feel their voices have not been heard.
Trump’s recently revealed disrespectful remarks about women fit with an identity of the alpha-male populist figure who is strong while his opponents are “weak”, “crooked”, and lacking in “stamina”.
The leader is central to the idea of populism. It is the leader who will emancipate the “people” on their behalf, unshackling them from the ills, constraints, and indignities imposed upon them by a corrupt and indifferent elite. 
Populism has been a part of American politics from its inception. The Anti-Federalists were a populist response to the push for the Constitution and the strong national government it created. 
But, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed, Americans have been able to keep populism at bay and avoid the emergence of democratic despotism to the extent that they resist reliance on strong authority figures to emancipate them. They rely more on themselves and their democratic capacities to work together to affect change in some aspect of political life. 
This is the same contrast Barack Obama drew during his speech at this year’s Democratic National Convention between his view of America and the narrative developed by the Trump campaign.
<h2>A slow-moving trainwreck?</h2>
Many Republicans are now abandoning Trump following signs his campaign may be coming off the rails completely. The release of a videoin which Trump describes himself as engaging in sexual assault led to scores of Republicans, including Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, abandoning him. 
However, despite early concerns, they had dutifully fallen in line endorsing him between the primaries and the convention.
One of America’s most-respected journalists, CBS’ Bob Schieffer, described Trump’s handling of himself in the second debate and particularly his threat to jail his opponent as “disgraceful” and beneath the dignity of the office he seeks. 
Yet polling reveals 2016 is one of the most stable races in modern times. The reason for this appears to be growing partisanship. There has been a significant uptick in this since the 1990s. 
Although there has been a consistent story about the level of undecideds and the level of support for third parties in this election, Democrat Hillary Clinton has retained a consistent lead since June 2016.
<h4> </h4>
<h2>Not going away</h2>
In many ways, the populist vein that Trump has tapped into won’t go away.
With a two-term Democratic president in the White House now, pundits have noted that 2016 is a “change election” whereby there is widespread fatigue for the incumbent party and demands for change, which has made the populist message resonate with so many. This has so far sustained Trump’s campaign where others might have failed.
Twitter users tend to cluster in partisan networks. Online networks are often critical for sustaining political rumours, which have played such a big part of the rise of Trump’s campaign. 
But it does not end there. If retweeting is a measure of Trump’s support on Twitter, he does not have fair-weather fans. Rather, they are in for the long haul. 
Consider the comparison between Trump and Clinton’s average tweet metrics in relation to the margin of Clinton’s polling lead. As Trump does worse in the polls, his retweets go up – whereas there is no statistically significant relationship between Clinton’s retweets and her polling margin. 
The conditions that made the Trump campaign possible will persist as long as there is a belief that governments are run by a corrupt and indifferent elite. It is a caution for whoever wins the White House that they will have to find new ways to connect with ordinary citizens.
Michael Jensen is senior research fellow, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of Canberra and author for The Conversation. He can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/michael-jensen-306913" target="_blank">here</a>.
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Us Election

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